

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 152221Z

62/43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/026 W

----- 000671

P R 151830Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2347

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0111

EXDIS/SALT

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 0111 VICE 011)

DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SESSION TO DATE (SALT-
TWO-470)

REF: STATE 210873

1. SUMMARY: ON THE WHOLE, I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE BEEN
SUCCESSFUL OVER THE PAST MONTH IN GETTING ACROSS TO THE SOVDEL
THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR POSITION AND IN CONVEYING SERIOUSNESS OF
OUR APPROACH.

WHILE COMPARED TO OTHER SESSIONS OF SLAT TWO. WE HAVE
RECEIVED SOMEWHAT MORE FROM SOVIETS IN WAY OF REACTIONS AND
APPARENT INTEREST IN OUR PROPOSITIONS, THEY NEVERTHELESS REFUSE
TO ACCEPT BASIC US CONCEPT OF "EQUIVALENCE" AS A BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION. THATER, THEY RIGIDLY ADHERE TO THEIR FORMULA OF
"EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE." THEY ALSO
REMAIN STEDFAST IN THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE RETENTION OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 152221Z

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT NUMBERS IN A NEW AGREEMENT.

WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT OFFERED ANY MAJOR NEW PROPOSAL, AND HAVE KEPT ALL THEIR OPTIONS OPEN, THEY HAVE ALTERED THEIR FORMULA OF SOME PREVIOUS PROPOSALS AND HAVE ATTEMPTED TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF INCREASED FLEXIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST SOME OF THEIR EARLIER POSITIONS.

--ON FBS, THEY HAVE SHIFTED FROM A DEMAND FOR A FIVE YEAR STAGED WITHDRAWAL TO A CALL FOR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM "IN PRINCIPLE" (WITHOUT DATES). HOWEVER, THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT, TO THE DEGREE THAT WITHDRAWAL IS NOT ACHIEVED, THEY MUST HAVE COMPENSATION IN THEIR CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

--ON AGGREGATES, THEY HAVE PROPOSED "A MAXIMUM AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVEL" OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS QUALIFIED BY THE CONDITIONS THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ICBM, SLBM, AND SSBN NUMBERS BE CARRIED FORWARD AS SUB-LIMITS AND THAT FBS, CARRIER AIRCRAFT, THIRD-COUNTRY FORCES, AND GEOGRAPHY ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

--ON MIRVS, THEY HAVE PROPOSED THAT EACH SIDE BE LIMITED TO MIRVING AN UNSPECIFIED PERCENTAGE OF ITS COMBINED TOTAL OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.

--ON THROW-WEIGHT, THEY CONTINUE TO CRITICIZE IT AS A STANDARD OF MEASUREMENT. IF NEVERTHELESS IT IS USED, THEY HAVE INSISTED THAT HEAVY BOMBERS AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE CARRIER AND FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT BE INCLUDED AT THEIR MAXIMUM PAYLOADS.

--ON REDUCTIONS, THEY HAVE DROPPED THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION THAT REDUCTIONS BE "SUBSEQUENT" AND HAVE SUBSTITUTED FOR IT A POSITION FOR INCLUSION IN A NEW AGREEMENT BUT SO CAREFULLY HEDGED THAT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT IT MIGHT ULTIMATELY MEAN.

--ON RESTRAINT AND NEW SYSTEMS, THEY HAVE CALLED FOR AGREED RESTRAINT ON DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS OVER THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT AND FOR VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 152221Z

--ON NEW SSBS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS, THEY HAVE DROPPED THEIR CALL FOR A FLAT BAN IN FAVOR OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE AT THIS TIME HOW MUCH ALL OF THIS REPRESENTS REAL CHANGE AND HOW MUCH IS OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES. END SUMMARY.

2. THERE FOLLOWS A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POSITIONS AND THEIR REACTIONS TO OUR PRESENTATION.

A. RELATION OF 1985 AGREEMENT TO INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN DISCUSSING AN AGREEMENT LASTING UNTIL 1985, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE THINKING OF AN AGREEMENT WITH ABOUT A TEN-YEAR TIME-PHASE BETWEEN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND NEW AGREEMENT. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN INSISTENT THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LEVELS LAST NOT ONLY THROUGH 1977, BUT THAT THEY ALSO BE CARRIED FOR THE DURATION OF THE 1985 AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT CHALLENGED OUR STATEMENTS THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO OUR STATEMENT THAT A 1985 AGREEMENT NEED NOT DEAL WITH ALL ISSUES, THEY HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT IT MUST DEAL WITH ALL ISSUES, THEY HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT IT MUST DEAL WITH LIMITATIONS ON ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

B. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS. SOVDEL DID NOT COMMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP SPECIFICALLY. IN THEIR FORMAL STATEMENT, THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER ONE ASPECT OF OUR STATEMENT, NOTING THAT THE "DELEGATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK ANY KIND OF ALTERNATIVES TO AN AGREEMENT...AND CERTAINLY NOT ALTERNATIVES LEADING TO CONTINUING OR SPURRING A RACE IN...ARMAMENTS." IN INFORMAL MEETINGS THEY HAVE CHARACTERIZED OUR STATEMENT AS "THREATENING" AND NOT CONDUCTIVE TO HELPFUL NEGOTIATION. IN REPLY, WE HAVE STRESSED THAT IT WAS SIMPLY A FACTUAL PRESENTATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR BOTH SIDES OF FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT AND WAS INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 152221Z

C. HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS. IN ADDITION TO OUR FORMAL STATEMENTS ON THE ELEMENTS OF EQUIVALENCE, I NOTED TO CHIEF OF SOVDEL THAT "IN STRICKING OVERALL BALANCE IT WAS THE SUM OF ALL THESE FACTORS" THAT WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO AVOID DISCUSSING THE AGREEMENT IN TERMS OF EQUIVALENCE OR BALANCE, IN SOME BILATERALS EVEN QUESTIONING THE PERTINENCE OF THESE CONCEPTS.

FOR THEIR PART, SOVIETS CONTINUE TO REJECT OUR CONCEPT OF "CENTRAL SYSTEMS" AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTANTLY REPEATED PRINCIPLE OF "EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE", INSIST THAT "ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS", INCLUDING FBS, MUST BE CONSIDERED. IN OCTOBER 1 STATEMENT, SOVDEL SPECIFIED SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED IN NEW AGREEMENT, AS ICBM

LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, SSBNS, STRATEGIC BOMBERS, ARRIER-BASED NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, AND FORWARD BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. IN ADDITION, THEY REQUIRE COMPENSATION IN "STRATEGIC SYSTEMS" FOR "GEOGRAPHIC " AND "THIRD-COUNTRY FORCES".

D. AGGREGATE NUMBERS. IN RESPONSE TO SIVIET QUESTIONING, RE MEANING OF "COMMON LOWER LEVEL", WE HAVE SAID THAT IT MEANS EVENTUAL EQUAL NUMBERS FOR BOTH SIDES.

THEY IN TURN, PROPOSED, ON OCTOBER 11, "A MAXIMUM AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVEL" REPEAT LEVEL FOR CENTRAL SYSTEMS, BUT MODIFIED THE PROPOSAL BY INSISTING THAT "IN DETERMINING THE SPECIFIC VALUES X THE MAXIMUM AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVELS REPEAT LEVELS FOR THE SIDES...IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS, THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS." ADDITIONALLY, THEY PROPOSED THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT NUMBERS FOR ICBMS, SLBMS, AND SSBNS, BE CARRIED FORWARD AS SUB-LEVELS WITH THE AGGREGATE. STATEMENT DID NOT SUGGEST HOW BOMBER NUMBERS WITHIN THE AGGREGATE WOULD BE DETERMINED. MY EFFORT TO CLARIFY WHETHER SOVIETS WERE IMPLYING DIFFERENTLY OVERALL LEVELS OR A COMMON OVERALL LEVEL (PERHAPS WITH DIFFERING SUB-LEVELS) WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. IT APPEARS THAT, EVEN IF THERE WERE TO BE A SINGLE EQUAL LEVEL FOR BOTH SIDES, SOVIET FORMULA FOR SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 SALT T 00111 01 OF 02 152221Z

"TAKING INTO ACCOUNT" FBS WOULD REQUIRE INCLUDING A FIGURE FOR FBS IN US TOTAL. ALTERNATIVELY, IF FBS IS NOT COUNTED IN US TOTAL, SOVIETS MAINTAINED BASIS FOR COMPENSATION FOR FBS IN UNEQUAL AGGREGATES FAVORING THEM. EVEN IF FBS WERE WITHDRAWN, SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED BASIS FOR COMPENSATION IN THE AGGREGATE FOR GE
ADP000
SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00111 02 OF 02 152012Z

67
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 130329

P R 151830Z OCT 74
FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIOOITY 2348
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0111

EXDIS/SALT

IN ADDITION, SOVIETS SAID THAT THEY "WILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE NUMBER" OF THEIR SUBMARINES IF THERE IS A BUILDUP IN THE NUMBER OF MODERN SSBNS IN "THIRD COUNTRIES" (NOT MERELY IN NATO).

FINALLY, THEY STATED THAT CARRIER DELIVERY AIRCRAFT "SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A PART OF STRATEGIC AVIATION." IF CVAS WERE WITHDRAWN ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPOSAL, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE "TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT".

E. THROW-WEIGHT. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THROW-WEIGHT AS A TRUE MEASURE OF POTENTIAL DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE STATED (ON OCTOBER 4) THAT "EVEN IF THROW-WEIGHT WERE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS", INCLUDING FBS AND CVA AIRCRAFT. "IN THIS CONNECTION, THE THROW-WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT WOULD BE THEIR MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD."

F. MIRVS. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET INQUIRIES REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG MIRVED MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT, THE NUMBER OF MIRVED MISSILE RVs AND THE NUMBER OF MIRVED MISSILE LAUNCHERS, WE HAVE IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION POINTED OUT THAT OUR PROPOSALS DID NOT USE THE TERM "EQUAL" WITH RESPECT TO THESE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00111 02 OF 02 152012Z

INDIVIDUAL

ELEMENTS AND THAT THEY ARE ALL INTERRELATED. THEY HAVE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF OVERALL THROW-WEIGHT ON THE ONE HAND AND MIRV LIMITATIONS ON THE OTHER. THEY HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO OUR MIRV POSITION OTHER THAN TO AGREE TO "GREAT IMPORTANCE" OF LIMITATIONS ON THEIR DEPLOYMENT AND TO PRESENT THEIR OWN PROPOSAL.

SOVIET PROPOSAL IS THAT "THE SIDES LIMIT THE OVERALL NUMBER OF (MIRV) ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS...TO ONLY A CERTAIN PORTION (IN PERCENTAGE) OF THE AGGREGATE LEVELS ESTABLISHED FOR THE SIDES." THEY HAVE BEEN FRANKLY AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHETHER THE PERCENTAGE WOULD BE EQUAL OR UNEQUAL FOR EACH SIDE. THEY HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT THERE WOULD BE FREEDOM TO ESTABLISH THE RATIO BETWEEN ICBM AND SLBM MIRVS AND THAT BOMBERS WITH ASMS WOULD BE "EQUATED TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF STRATEGIC MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS".

G. REDUCTIONS. INITIAL REACTION OF SOVDEL TO US STATEMENTS ON REDUCTIONS WAS CURIOSITY ABOUT THE SURPRISE AT EARLY

EMPHASIS ON SUBJECT BY US. FOR BULK OF SESSION THE AVOIDED SUBJECT, BUT ON OCTOBER 11, IN STATEMENT EMPHASIZING FBS AND THIRD COUNTRIES, MADE FOLLOWING BRIEF AND HEDGED FORMAL STATEMENT: "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EVERYTHING SAID IN THIS STATEMENT AS WELL AS EARLIER, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT PROVISIONS FOR SOME REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT...." THEY DID NOT SAY "MUTUAL REDUCTIONS". THEY ALSO DID NOT SAY "SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS" AS THEY HAVE FORMERLY.

H. STABILITY. EXCEPT FOR ONE SLANTING REFERENCE ON OCTOBER 8, SOVDEL HAS IGNORED USP PRESENTATIONS OF CONCEPT OF CRISIS STABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, CHIEF OF SOVDEL HAS TAKEN STRONG EXCEPTION, ONCE "UNDER INSTRUCTIONS", TO STATEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON ON A DOCTRINE FOR "LIMITED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HE SAID THE SOVIET CONCERN WAS THAT THE DOCTRINE WAS "ONE OF PROPAGANDIZING NUCLEAR WAR" AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD "PROFOUND DOUBTS" AS TO THE "CAPABILITY" OF THOSE WHO PROFESS THE DOCTRINE TO "STOP HALFWAY IN THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS."

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00111 02 OF 02 152012Z

I. NEW SYSTEMS AND RESTRAINT. IN RESPONSE TO MY OCTOBER 4 STATEMENT ON MIRVS, SOVIETS IN BILATERAL WERE QUICK TO NOTE REFERENCE TO THE "DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MIRVS" BUT HAVE NOT COMMENTED ON IT OR ON MY OTHER STATEMENTS REGARDING CONSTRAINT NEW SYSTEMS.

FOR ITS PART, SOVDEL HAS REVISED ITS LIST OF STRATEGIC ARMS TO BE BANNED. THE LIST NOW OMITTS NEW-GENERATION SSBNS AND NEW STRATEGIC BOMBERS, BUT ADDS A BON ON "STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE REENTRY BEHICLES OF THE MANEUVERABLE TYPE AND THOSE WITH GROUND-TARGET GOMING". THIS LAST IS IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE CARRYOVER CATEGORIES OF LONG-RAGNED ASMS (OVER 600KMS.), SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES (OVER 600KMS.), INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES, STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE AND WATERBORNE (OTHER THAN SUBMARINE) PLATFORMS, AND SEABED DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES. WITH THE EXCPETION OF SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES (AND THE 600KMS. RANGE LIMIT), THE SYSTEMS THE SOVIETS PROPOSE TO BAN INCLUDE CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS WHICH THE US HAS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED IN SALT TWO COULD BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS.

THE SOVIETS NOW PROPOSE TO MAKE NEWA-GENARATION SSBMS AND NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS SUBJECT TO APPARENT LIMITATIONS ON DEPLOYMENT WITHIN AN AGREEMENT RATHER THAN THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION THAT THEY BE BANNED. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR "MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC

ARMS". IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS "MAXIMUM RESTRAINT" WOULD APPLY TO THE PACE OR AMGNITUDE OF DEPLOYMENTS, OR TO BOTH. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT DURING THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES "EXERCISE RESTRAINT" SPECIFICALLY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE SYSTEMS THEY PROPOSE TO BAN.

J. MOBILES. NEITHER SIDE HAS MENTIONED LAN-MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS. SOVIETS HAVE, AS NOTED ABOVE, PROPOSED A BAN ON AIRBORNE, NON-SSBM WATERBORNE, AND SEABED MOBILES.

K. VERIFICATION. US MIRV STATEMENT, WHICH INCLUDED REFERENCE TO "SPECIAL MEASURES", INITIALLY GENERATED CONCERNED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00111 02 OF 02 152012Z

REACTION ON THE PART OF SOVDEL REGARDING QUESTION OF WHETHER US WAS SUGGESTING SOMETHING MORE THAN NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WHEN ASSURED THAT SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE, SOVIETS IN BILATERALS INDICATED THAT THEY EITHER DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SUGGESTION FO "SPECIAL MEASURES" OR THAT THEY SAW GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION; THEY NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THEIR ICBM LAUNCHER MODERNIZATION WOULD PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT MIRVED ICBMS WERE TO BE DEPLOYED THERIN, AND THEY ASSUMED US WOULD BE DOING THE SAME.

L. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. SOVDEL HAS AT LENGTH RESTATED ITS TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS ON FBS, AND HAS REGULARLY COMPLAINED AT OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN MODIFICATIONS IN THEIR POSITION WHICH APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED TO CONVEY AN IMPRESSION OF SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART. WHILE THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST ONC CONSIDERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRICKING SOVIET TERRITORY, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT ON CVAS AND FORWARD-BASING OF SSBNS (TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND THIRD-COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES), THEY HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF THESE WEAPONS AND THEIR BASES "IN PRINCIPLEZ AND OF TAKING THESE FACTORS "INTO CACCOUNT" INSOFAR AS WITHDRAWAL AND LIQUIDATION HAVE NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY HAVE SAID THAT THE 1985 TIME FRAME "OFFERS NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSIDERING VARIANTS." THEY APPEAR TO BE SHIFTING FROM ASKING FOR NEAR-TERM WITHDRAWAL TO "RESOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE" AND WITHDRAWAL OVER A LONGER TERM WITH "COMPENSATION" IN THE INTERIM. THEY HAVE ALSO REPEATED EARLIER POSITION THAT "FIRST OF ALL" THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON NO NEW FORWARD NUCLEAR BASES. JOHNSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETING PROCEEDINGS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: shawdg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974SALTT00111
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740293-0323
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741046/aaaabnkh.tel
Line Count: 378
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: STATE 210873
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 MAY 2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <18 MAR 2003 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SESSION TO DATE (SALT- TWO-470)
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005